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Abstract
Firm operators continually manage multiple sources of risk. In an application to cattle feedlot operations,
our objective is to determine if producers view output price and animal health risks separately or jointly.
We conduct a survey with a choice experiment placing operators in forward looking, decision-making
scenarios, and capture information on past risk management approaches. Evidence regarding a relation-
ship between animal health and output price risk mitigation is mixed and depends on the decision being
made. Combined, these results provide new insight into how managers approach multiple risks when fac-
ing resource constraints.
Keywords: animal health; cattle; feedlot; price; management; risk
JEL Classifications: D22; D81; Q02; Q12; Q13
Firms must continually manage multiple sources of risk while operating with a resource con-
straint, whether that firm is a commercial fishing operation (Smith and Wilen, 2005), a space
shuttle tile manufacturer (Pate-Cornell, 1996), or a livestock producer. Economists recognize
potential correlations between multiple sources of risk and understand trade-offs exist between
risk mitigation strategies (Smith and Wilen, 2005). For example, Du et al. (2015) investigated
the relationship between crop producers’ use of marketing contracts and crop insurance, two risk
mitigation strategies. Furthermore, Smith and Wilen (2005) determined commercial fishermen’s
preferences for physical and financial risks are positively correlated. Similar to fishermen and crop
producers, cattle feedlot operators face multiple sources of risk, which impact profitability.
Cattle feedlot operators buy feeder cattle (approximately 1 year of age, weighing between 600
and 1,000 pounds (lbs)), feed and care for them for about 6 months, and then sell fed (or live)
cattle (finish weight between 1,200 and 1,400 lbs) to a beef processor.1 Agricultural producers,
including feedlot operations, face input and output price (marketing), production, human, legal,
and financial risk (Crane et al., 2013). Past literature has often focused on price or yield risk in
isolation. Few studies have sought to understand the relationship between multiple risks and no
study has investigated how feedlot producers actually manage these multiple risks. Our analysis
seeks to fill this gap.
Price risk is one of the largest risks faced by producers (Belasco et al., 2009; Goodwin and
Schroeder, 1994). Furthermore, beef cattle producers rank cattle price variability as one of the
© The Author(s) 2021. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited.
1For overview of the beef industry, see figure 1 pp 6 of U.S. Government Accountability Office (2018).
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top potential risk factors on their operation (Hall et al., 2003). Accordingly, research has largely
focused on the role of futures and options markets to mitigate price risk from corn price increases
(input), feeder cattle price increases (input), and live cattle price decreases (output) (Hart,
Babcock, and Hayes, 2001; Mark, Schroeder, and Jones, 2000; Schroeder and Hayenga, 1988;
Tonsor and Schroeder, 2011). Recognizing the price risk faced by livestock producers, the
2000 Agricultural Protection Act extended crop insurance to livestock. The U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency oversees two insurance programs to help live-
stock producers manage price risk, the Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) and Livestock Gross
Margin (LGM) programs. In 2019, both LGM and LRP were enhanced to better suit needs of
livestock producers including expanded coverage to all 50 states and increased subsidy rates
(Feedstuffs, 2019).
In addition to price risk, feedlot operators face production risks that extend beyond feed con-
version and average daily gain (ADG). Many factors in U.S. cattle marketing practices contribute
to the potential disease risk and stress of incoming cattle including cattle commingled from dif-
ferent sources, traveling long distances, and abrupt changes in diet and feed intake (Step et al.,
2008). Given that feedlots recognize the impact different calf management practices can have
on feedlot performance and carcass quality, premiums exist for value-added programs which
decrease disease and production risk such as source and age verification, preconditioning and
weaning programs (Blank, Saitone, and Sexton, 2016; Zimmerman et al., 2012). Furthermore, ani-
mal disease events, like bovine spongiform encephalopathy in late 2003, may be rare, but are dam-
aging, if not devastating, to operations that experience drastic reductions in output or spikes in
production costs (Schroeder et al., 2015). For this analysis, we choose to focus on one potential
health and disease risk mitigation strategy—procuring feeder cattle from a single known source.
When feedlot operators make placement decisions, they can procure the quantity of feeder
cattle desired from a single seller or assemble feeder cattle from multiple sources. When placed
in feedlots, feeder cattle must adapt to new environments, establish a social hierarchy, and adjust
to a new diet (Rambo, 2014). Commingling feeder cattle from multiple sources into a single pen at
the feedlot versus cattle being from a single source has been associated with higher morbidity rates
due to increased stress and pathogen exposure, especially in studies of bovine respiratory disease
(Edwards, 2010; O’Connor, Sorden, and Apley, 2005; Step et al., 2008). Furthermore, Step et al.
(2008) found that calves from single source tended to have higher ADG than calves in com-
mingled pens or calves purchased from auction markets. Health costs were also less for calves
from a single source that were weaned for 45 days prior to transport than those shipped immedi-
ately after weaning or commingled from multiple sources. Abidoye and Lawrence (2006) found
that single source cattle had superior carcass quality, health, and performance than backgrounded
or commingled preconditioned cattle. Therefore, single source cattle have been shown to decrease
animal health and production risks compared to cattle of unknown backgrounds or commingled
cattle.
Belasco et al. (2009) developed an ex-ante model of price and yield risks associated with cattle
feeding, determining that both of these risks have statistically significant impacts on the condi-
tional mean and variability of profits. However, no study has investigated how feedlot producers
actually manage multiple risk sources. Our objective is to determine if feedlot producers manage
output price risk and animal health risk as two separate and independent risks or if they manage
them jointly. To accomplish this, we surveyed feedlot operators about their historical use of risk
management strategies and risk attitudes. We also included a choice experiment where respond-
ents made decisions in situations intentionally designed to meet this project objective. For output
(live cattle) price risk management, we focus on producers’ use of futures hedging (buying/selling
futures contracts or buying options contracts), forward contracts, other programs (e.g., LRP insur-
ance, LGM insurance), or accepting cash (spot market) price at the time of sale. For animal health
risk we focus on a producers’ management of animal health within their operation, specifically
feeder cattle procurement. Determining if and what kind of relationship exists between animal
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health and output price risk mitigation can inform the development of more complete risk miti-
gation strategies.
The main contribution of this research is determining whether cattle feedlot operators manage
output price and animal health risk independently or jointly. Operations have a fixed budget.
Therefore, feedlot operators could decide to implement increased animal health risk mitigation
strategies instead of hedging using futures market contracts (substitute relationship). Conversely,
animal health and output price risk mitigation strategies could be complements. For example,
management practices could decrease uncertainty in production and therefore operators could
better match their production to futures contracts, increasing futures contract usage. This could
possibly help explain past “surprises” by analysts when producers have hedged price risk less than
scholars “expected” (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001).
1. Conceptual Model
Producers face uncertain outcomes when utilizing risk management practices. They will choose to
implement a practice if their expected utility of profits when using the practice exceeds their
expected utility of profits without the practice. Following Moschini and Hennessy (2001), we
assume feedlot operators make decisions on output price and animal health risk management
by comparing the expected utility of profit from different scenarios. Assume feedlot operator i
will make decisions to maximize their expected utility:
EUi  E Ui w0;i  π̃i
  
(1)
where EUi is the expected utility of feedlot operator i, w0;i is initial wealth, and π̃i is profit from the
cattle feeding enterprise which is a random variable (i subscripts are hereafter omitted for conve-





Profit per pen of cattle is a function of input and output prices and quantities. However, when
feedlot operators place cattle there is uncertainty about prices and quantities—making profit a
random variable. Following Moschini and Hennessy (2001), profit can be rewritten as:
π̃  PGx; ẽ  rx  K (3)
where P is output price, Gx; ẽ is a stochastic production function where realized output depends
on the input vector x and a random variable ẽ, r is a vector of input prices, and K is fixed costs.
This framework can be adapted to feedlot operators’ decision-making under price and animal
health risk, holding all else equal. In online supplementary Appendix A, we consider two demon-
strative scenarios, allowing one risk type to vary while holding the other fixed.
One link between mitigating output price risk and utilizing animal health production practices
could be the expectation of total pounds of finished cattle versus the actual pounds produced.
Expected and actual pounds produced can vary from weather, animal disease, and management,
among other factors. These production risks can result in reductions in ADG per animal or death
loss. A large variance in pounds produced per pen could alter producers’ risk mitigation strategies.
For example, feedlot operators may be less likely to establish an expected selling price because they
cannot properly assess the number of futures contracts needed or specifications they should agree
to in a forward contract. However, if animal health production practices decrease finishing weight
variability and death loss, then operators may make more informed output price risk management
decisions.
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Substitute, complementary, or no relationship could exist between output price risk and animal
health risk mitigation strategies. Risk mitigation strategies are not free and feedlot operations have
a limited budget. A feedlot operator could decide the feedlot should only invest in animal health
mitigation strategies instead of also managing output price risk—an example of substitution.
Alternatively, operators could view output price and animal health risk mitigation strategies as
complements. Instead there could be no relationship between feedlot operators’ decisions regard-
ing price risk and animal health risk mitigation strategies. Determining this relationship is a core
component of our analysis. We hypothesize there is some relationship between output price risk
and animal health risk mitigation strategies. However, to investigate this hypothesis, we need to
analyze individual feedlot operators’ decision-making.
2. Data Collection
Primary data were collected from feedlot operators, see online supplementary Appendix B for the
survey instrument. The survey was programmed for Web application using Qualtrics software
(Qualtrics Provo, UT, USA). Feedlots in Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas were sur-
veyed. These states comprise five of the eight states in the widely cited, “5-market” average price
reported by the USDA. Furthermore, these states house nearly 31% of U.S. feedlots with sales for
slaughter and 76% of feedlot sales according to the 2017 Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS,
2019a). The Colorado Livestock Association, Iowa Cattlemen’s Association, Kansas Livestock
Association, Nebraska Cattleman, and Texas Cattle Feeders Association distributed a uniform
resource locator through an email list of members. To increase survey response and expand dis-
tribution, Feedlot Magazine also distributed the survey web address to its subscribers.2
After answering several introductory questions on the survey, respondents were asked to par-
ticipate in a choice experiment. The respondent’s past use of risk management and attitudes con-
cerning risk were also obtained in the survey.
The survey was live from January 19, 2017 to February 14, 2017.3 There were 588 responses.4
However, 232 participants who did not have a feedlot enterprise and/or did not make price or
animal health risk management decisions were dismissed from the survey after the qualification
questions. Additionally, 75 participants who qualified to continue but did not answer the choice
experiment questions were excluded—reducing the useable sample to 281.
Table 1 reports selected survey respondent characteristics. The sample is representative of U.S.
feedlot producers. Feedlot operators from Iowa comprise 50% of the sample, Nebraska 19%, Texas
10%, Kansas 6%, and Colorado 5%. According to the 2017 Census of Agriculture, there were 9,309
feedlot operations with sales for slaughter in these five states: 4% from Colorado, 59% from Iowa,
11% from Kansas, 22% from Nebraska, and 4% from Texas (USDA-NASS, 2019a). Fifty-eight
percent of respondents are from operations with capacity over 1,000 head. With respect to
December 1, 2017, the Census of Agriculture reports operations with 1,000 or more head of cattle
on feed comprised 12% of feedlots from these five states but 86% of the cattle on feed inventory
(USDA-NASS, 2019a). Thus, the operations within our sample are larger than the census average
2An operation could have received an invitation from multiple sources (i.e., their state cattlemen’s association and Feedlot
Magazine). However, the “prevent ballot box stuffing” option was used in Qualtrics to prevent participants from taking the
survey more than once.
3Feedlot Magazine sent the survey invitation on January 19 and 26, Iowa Cattlemen’s Association on January 19 and 26,
Kansas Livestock Association on January 19 and 30, Nebraska Cattleman on January 23 and 30, Texas Cattle Feeders
Association on January 24 and 30, and Colorado Livestock Association on February 8.
4The authors did not have access to the email lists of possible participants as the partner organizations sent the invitations to
participants. Therefore, we do not know the total number of operations who received an invitation to complete the survey. As
such, no response rate could be calculated because there was no defined sample.
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but do represent the majority of feedlot inventories.5 Just over 20% of survey participants are con-
sidered custom feeders owning less than 40% of cattle in their feedlot.6 According to the 2017
Census of Agriculture, in these five states 7% of farms custom fed cattle shipped directly for
slaughter, accounting for 42% of the sales for slaughter (USDA-NASS, 2019a).
The average respondent age is 49 years old, with a minimum and maximum age of 23 and
85 years. In the 2017 Census of Agriculture, the simple average age of cattle feedlot producers
was 55 for the five surveyed states (USDA-NASS, 2019b).7 Given that our survey was administered
online, the younger average age is expected. Nearly half of the participants have at least a
Bachelor’s degree. This educational attainment is similar to other studies of beef producers. In
McKendree, Tonsor and Wolf (2018), 51% of cow–calf producers surveyed had earned at least
a Bachelor’s degree.
Participants were asked questions to gauge their risk aversion following the Global Risk-
Attitude Construct (GRAC) defined in Pennings and Garcia (2001). It was determined that factor
variables were not needed as only one GRAC question captures risk attitudes. Therefore, partic-
ipants are considered risk averse (nearly 57%) if they somewhat agree, agree, or strongly agree with
the statement, “I usually like ‘playing it safe’ (for instance, ‘locking in a price’) instead of taking
risks for market prices for fed cattle.”
Since animal health and price risk management are of key interest, participants were asked
about their past price determination methods and past feeder cattle sourcing. Participants were
Table 1. Summary statistics
Treatment
Full sample 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of observations 281 40 41 42 36 42 41 38
CO 5.34% 5.00% 7.32% 4.76% 5.56% 2.38% 4.88% 7.89%
IA 49.47% 47.50% 51.22% 40.48% 44.44% 61.90% 46.34% 55.26%
KS 6.41% 2.50% 4.88% 11.90% 11.11% 0.00% 9.76% 5.26%
NE 18.86% 22.50% 17.07% 19.05% 22.22% 14.29% 21.95% 15.79%
TX 10.32% 12.50% 14.63% 7.14% 8.33% 11.90% 12.20% 5.26%
Age (years) 49.16 51.60 49.17 46.31 49.58 49.59 50.83 46.75
Bachelor’s degree 49.47% 40.00% 60.98% 45.24% 44.44% 42.86% 56.10% 57.89%
Risk averse 56.58% 52.50% 56.10% 57.14% 61.11% 69.05% 51.22% 50.00%
Capacity 1,000 58.36% 50.00% 63.41% 69.05% 58.33% 54.76% 53.66% 60.53%
Custom feeders 21.35% 12.50% 19.51% 26.19% 22.22% 23.81% 17.07% 26.32%
Purchased single source before 64.77% 70.00% 63.41% 66.67% 63.89% 66.67% 63.41% 60.53%
Past futures hedge percent 18.50% 19.00% 20.98% 17.41% 15.83% 17.62% 20.20% 18.68%
Past forward contract percent 17.78% 14.23% 21.76% 24.86% 17.50% 14.88% 14.08% 15.92%
5The census definition of a farm is any place that produced and sold, or normally would have sold, $1,000 or more of
agricultural products during the census year (USDA-NASS, 2019a).
6The custom feeder determination was made by the researchers such that the majority of animals fed were not owned by the
feedlot.
7The cattle feedlots (North American Industry Classification System [NAICS] 112112) industry was used and comprises
establishments primarily engaged in feeding cattle for fattening (OMB, 2017).
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considered to actively manage animal health risk if they purchased feeder cattle from a single
source. Nearly 65% of participants have purchased single source calves before. This finding is con-
sistent with NAHMS beef feedlot 2011 study which found that 56.4% of feedlots had purchased
feeder cattle through direct sales. However, direct sales accounted for less than 30% of feeder cattle
purchased (USDA-APHIS-VS-NAHMS, 2013). Participants were also asked how they believed
calves from a single source perform compared to calves sourced with unknown backgrounds
(Table 2). Over 85% of producers stated single source calves performed somewhat or much better
than calves from unknown backgrounds.8
There was variability in futures hedging and forward contracting behavior, with the percentage
use of each ranging from 0 to 100% (Table 3). On average, participants hedged 19% of finished
cattle using futures contracts and 18% utilized forward contracts (Tables 1 and 3). Spot cash mar-
ket was the most frequently used with over 50% of producers selling at least 50% of their cattle this
way. LRP insurance and LGM insurance were rarely used.
3. Research Methodology: Past Behavior
The survey contained two questions regarding past risk management behavior which serves
as the first test of whether a relationship exists between price and animal health risk management.
The first question was designed to identify feeder cattle sources. Respondents were asked to allo-
cate the percentage (summing to 100%) for each source including traditional auction; satellite/
video auction; purchased direct from seller (ranch); home raised from own cow-herd; custom
Table 2. Participants’ response to “Compared to calves sourced from auctions with unknown
backgrounds, how do you believe calves from a single source ranch perform (i.e. average daily
gain, feed conversion, morbidity) in the feedlot?”
Number reporting Percent reporting
Much worse 1 0%
Somewhat worse 5 2%
About the same 34 12%
Somewhat better 145 52%
Much better 95 34%
Total 280 100%
8A reviewer aptly pointed out single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, may not be the only
source of calves that are considered less risky from an animal health standpoint. First, stocker producers could decrease animal
health risk by commingling cattle and then selling them as large lots either through a traditional auction, satellite/video auc-
tion, or some other method to feedlot operators. Second, producers exist who market feeder cattle after commingling them
frommultiple sources who have a reputation for putting together low risk cattle from a health standpoint. We agree, however,
this does not necessarily diminish the importance of single source calves to producers. To examine how these two factors may
impact how feedlot producers perceive the value of single source calves, we estimated two cross tabulations from the survey
data used for this analysis. Specifically, (1) “Compared to calves sourced from auctions with unknown backgrounds, how do
you believe calves from a single source ranch perform (i.e. average daily gain, feed conversion, morbidity) in the feedlot?” and
“What is the average placement weight of calves your feeding operation places in March?” and (2) “Compared to calves
sourced from auctions with unknown backgrounds, how do you believe calves from a single source ranch perform (i.e. average
daily gain, feed conversion, morbidity) in the feedlot?” and “How important is seller reputation for the feeder cattle you buy?”Using
Persons χ2, we find no statistical differences in either cross-tabulation. Thus, there is additional evidence of the value single known
source feeder cattle to feedlot buyers. See online supplementary appendix D for cross-tabulations and explanations.
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fed, so I did not buy or own animals; and other. We choose to look at participants’ use of pur-
chasing direct from seller (ranch) as the health risk mitigation strategy of interest. Participants
were considered to mitigate animal health risk if they purchased feeder cattle directly from the
seller (ranch). The second question was designed to identify pricing methods for marketing fin-
ished cattle. Respondents were asked to allocate the percentage (summing to 100%) for each
method including spot cash market; forward contract or marketing agreement; futures hedge;
options hedge; LRP insurance; LGM insurance; and other. Cattle marketed using the spot price
only were considered to not be mitigating price risk.
Tobit models were utilized to estimate the relationship between past behavior of purchasing
feeder animals direct from seller and output price risk management. The two latent variables of
interest (indicated with a * subscript), the percent of feeder cattle purchased direct from seller




directselleri  δ1spoti  X 0direct;iβdirect  εdirect;i (4)
spoti  δ2directselleri  X0spot;iβspot  εspot;i (5)





if 0 ≤ directselleri ≤ 100
if directselleri < 0
if directselleri > 100
8<
: (6)
Table 3. Participants’ response to “In the past 12 months, what percentage of the following pricing methods did your
operation use for marketing finished cattle (should sum to 100%)”
Spot cash market
Forward contract or
marketing agreement Futures hedge
# % # % # %
0% 45 16% 176 63% 165 59%
1–25% 53 19% 37 13% 42 15%
26–50% 39 14% 24 9% 40 14%
51–75% 27 10% 13 5% 17 6%
76–100% 114 41% 29 10% 16 6%








# % # % # % # %
0% 224 80% 278 99% 281 100% 276 98%
1–25% 26 9% 2 1% 0 0% 0 0%
26–50% 22 8% 1 0% 0 0% 1 0%
51–75% 5 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
76–100% 4 1% 0 0% 0 0% 4 1%
Total 281 100% 281 100% 281 100% 281 100%





if 0 ≤ spoti ≤ 100
if spoti < 0
if spoti > 100:
8<
: (7)
In equations (4) and (5), δ1 and δ2 are the coefficients of interest. X0S;i (where S  direct; spot) is a
vector of explanatory variables for each individual i and an intercept, βS are coefficient estimate
vectors, and εS;i  N 0; σ2S
 
. Equations (4) and (5) are estimated with maximum likelihood. Mod-
els were estimated using the cmp command in Stata (Roodman, 2011).
4. Results and Discussion: Past Behavior
Average marginal effects (AME) for historical single source feeder cattle purchases are shown in
Table 4. Model A is the base model, including an intercept and past percent of finished animals
priced only on the spot market. Model B includes three additional binary explanatory variables:
1,000 head capacity equals 1 if the feedlot’s capacity is greater than or equal to 1,000 head, 0
otherwise; risk aversion equals 1 if participants somewhat agree, agree, or strongly agree with the
statement, “I usually like ‘playing it safe’ (for instance, ‘locking in a price’) instead of taking risks
for market prices for fed cattle.”, 0 otherwise; and custom feeder equals 1 if the operation owned
less than 40% of the calves placed on feed in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise.
The historical spot marketing AMEs are statistically significant and similar in models A and B
(Table 4). Based on model B, when the historical percentage of finished cattle priced on the spot
market increases by 1%, the historical percentage of feeder cattle purchased direct from seller
decreases by 0.09%. Thus, those who purchase single source feeder animals were also more likely
to use output price risk management as opposed to pricing fed cattle on the spot cash market.
Additionally, in model B, operations with 1,000 head capacity historically purchased approxi-
mately 7% more of their feeder animals directly from sellers than smaller operations.
A relationship is also present between historical percentage of feeder cattle purchased direct
from sellers and output price risk in models C and D (Table 5). Model C seeks to explain the
historical percent of cattle priced on the spot market only (no price risk mitigation), controlling
for an intercept, and the historical percent of feeder cattle purchased direct from seller. Model D
includes additional explanatory variables for capacity, risk aversion, and custom feeders. Based on
model D, a 1% increase in the historical percentage of feeder animals purchased direct from seller
decreases head priced on the spot market by 0.18% (implying an increase in cattle marketed with
some risk management technique). This is similar to the relationship found in models A and B,
however, larger in magnitude. Additionally, larger operations and risk averse producers priced
about 13% and 22% less of their finished animals on the spot market, respectively. Thus, larger
feedlots and risk averse operators are more likely to use price risk mitigation strategies.
These regressions of past behavior suggest a relationship exists between animal health (pur-
chasing feeder animals directly from sellers) and output price (spot market only versus establish-
ing a selling price) risk mitigation strategies. Overall, there is a negative relationship between
historical single source feeder animal purchases and solely pricing in the spot (cash) market.
Conversely, a positive relationship exists between historical single source procurement and using
an output price risk mitigation strategy (not solely using the spot market for price determination).
The relationship between animal health and price risk mitigation is worth further investigating
and the decision under consideration (feeder cattle procurement or output price hedging) is
important when documenting the relationship.
These regressions do not control for other factors that might be considered in a producer’s risk
mitigation decision. For example, source premium, basis, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
price, and the type of output price risk management strategy were not considered. Accordingly, we
leverage the ability of choice experiments to better understand a feedlot operator’s decision-
making regarding risk management and to control for other information that impacts a producer’s
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decision. Past studies of cattle producers that utilized surveys, including choice experiments, were
successful in finding results consistent with market observations (Tonsor, 2018; Schumacher,
Schroeder, and Tonsor, 2012; Schulz and Tonsor, 2010).
5. Research Methodology: Choice Experiment
Each respondent completed a choice experiment, designed to not be overly complex, which resembled a
realistic turn of cattle in a feedlot and decisions regarding either feeder cattle procurement or live cattle
marketing. To assess individual feedlot operators’ decision-making process, operators were placed in a
realistic decision-making mindset where they were making decisions and forming expectations around
events that will happen in the future. They were asked to make decisions as if it were February 15, 2017
for feeder animals being placed in March 2017 with an expected August 2017 closeout.
A seven-treatment design (Table 6) was utilized to test if a relationship exists between animal
health and output price risk management. Comparing results across scenarios isolates differences
of central interest, similar to Tonsor, Schroeder, and Lusk (2013). The animal health, feeder cattle
procurement practice of interest was known single source feeder steers versus feeder steers of
unknown background. The live cattle output price risk management strategies were futures hedge,
forward contract, other, or none (accept cash price at the time of sale). An additional difference
across designs is how the expected futures basis was presented. The futures hedge basis was
Table 5. Historical spot marketing of finished cattle average marginal effects (N= 278)
Model C Model D








Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05, *** P< 0.01.
Table 4. Historical direct from seller average marginal effects (N= 278)
Model A Model B








Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05, *** P< 0.01.
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Table 6. Split-sample design
Treatment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Placement, animal-health risk oriented Output price risk oriented
Question A Question B Question A Question B Question A Question B
Single source premium shown? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Output pricing information shown:
CME price? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Expected local basis? Yes Yes Yes
Ambiguous local basis? Yes Yes Yes










presented two ways: unambiguous (e.g., −$1.00/cwt) or ambiguous (e.g., 35% chance of being less
than −$1.00/cwt and 65% chance of being greater than −$1.00/cwt) (Di Mauro and Maffioletti,
2004). Basis ambiguity was included to understand how producers form their price expectations
and how basis uncertainty might alter risk mitigation decisions.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the seven treatments (Table 6). Treatments
fall into two broad categories consistent with the initial assessment of past behavior: feeder cattle
procurement (treatments 1–3) or live cattle marketing (treatments 4–7). Treatments 1–3 consisted
of two choice scenarios about procuring a lot of feeder steers, see Figure 1 for an example of treat-
ment 2. Participants were given the following information:
“Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally consid-
ered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and lower
morbidity at the feedlot. Suppose it is February 15th. You are looking to buy feeder steers for
March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale. A sale lot of 150 feeder steers,
which will weigh approximately 800 lbs each at placement, are available for purchase from a
single known ranch for a premium of ${random premium}/cwt over cattle purchased at an
auction from unknown sources.”
Then they were asked,
“Of the 150 head of feeder steers available from the single source ranch, howmany would you
purchase?”
Figure 1. Treatment 2 example.
Note: The two questions were presented on successive screens and not simultaneously.
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In this first question, no output pricing information is given and the exact same initial question is
given in treatments 1–3. However, in the second question additional potential output pricing
information is provided as an information shock. In treatments 1 and 3, participants are provided
information needed for a futures hedge, including the August CME live cattle futures contract
price and expected local basis. In treatment 1, the futures basis is unambiguous, but is ambiguous
in treatment 3. In treatment 2, information for a forward contract, including the August CME live
cattle futures contract price and offered basis, is provided. By comparing responses across the two
questions, we can test our core hypothesis as it relates to feeder cattle procurement.
Treatments 4–7 each include one scenario where the participant was told they just purchased
150 head of feeder steers for March placement which they expected to sell in August (Figure 2).
A random August CME live cattle futures contract price was also provided. Treatments 4 and 5 are
the base treatments where no feeder cattle source information was given. In treatments 6 and 7,
participants were also told the steers were purchased from a single source and given a random
premium paid (information shock). After this introductory information, participants were asked
how many head they would place in each of the four output pricing strategies provided—futures
hedge, forward contract, other output price strategy, or accept local cash price at the time of sale.
In treatments 5 and 7, an ambiguous live cattle basis for futures hedges was presented while basis
was unambiguous in treatments 4 and 6. By comparing responses across treatments, we can
understand if/how producers alter decisions when animal health and price risks are individually
versus jointly examined. In particular, treatments 4 and 6 (non-ambiguous basis) can be com-
pared, and treatments 5 and 7 (ambiguous basis) can be compared. To keep the manuscript con-
cise, methods and results for treatments 4–7 can be found in online supplementary Appendix C.
Values of key variables in the choice design were randomly drawn for each participant from a
range selected to match current market conditions. The source premium shown ranged from
$1.00 to $10.00/cwt (Blank, Saitone, and Sexton, 2016), the August CME live cattle futures con-
tract price ranged from $95.00 to $110.00/cwt (consistent with the market as of January 9, 2017),
all basis numbers ranged from −$5.00 to $5.00/cwt (consistent with historical basis numbers from
the Livestock Marketing Information Center [LMIC] [2016]), and the random ambiguous basis
percent ranged from 1 to 99%.
Figure 2. Treatment 7 example.
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The choice experiments were hypothetical; however, our instructions specifically stated, “[ : : : ]. It
is important that you make your selection as if you were actually facing these choices in operation of
your feed yard.” Cheap talk scripts, such as the one provided, have been shown to reduce hypotheti-
cal bias in choice experiment research (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Lusk, 2003; Tonsor and Shupp,
2011). Furthermore, Lusk and Schroeder (2004) found that although total willingness to pay was
overstated in hypothetical choice experiments, marginal willingness to pay was not statistically dif-
ferent across hypothetical and actual payment scenarios. Thus, hypothetical bias concerns are miti-
gated since our core hypotheses tests depend on net differences across treatments (Tonsor, 2011).
Econometrically, systems of Tobit models are utilized because the dependent variables (either
feeder cattle purchased or head placed in each output price risk strategy) are continuous but cen-
sored between 0 and 150. Using these methods, marginal effects can be calculated and compared
across designs to identify if relationships exist between animal health risk mitigation and output
price risk mitigation.
5.1. Feeder Cattle Placement Scenarios (Treatments 1–3)
For treatments 1–3, the two latent variables of interest (indicated with a * subscript) are the total
head purchased when output pricing information is not shown (feederheadAi ) and total head
purchased when output price information is shown (feederheadBi ). These variables can be mod-
eled as:
feederheadAi  X0A;iβA  εA;i (8)
feederheadBi  X0B;iβB  εB;i (9)





if 0 ≤ feederheadAi ≤ 150
if feederheadAi < 0







if 0 ≤ feederheadBi ≤ 150
if feederheadBi < 0
if feederheadBi > 150:
8<
:
In equations (8) and (9), X0k;i (where k  A; B) is a vector of information given in the question (e.g.,
source premium, CME price, basis) and explanatory variables for each individual i, βk are coefficient
estimate vectors, and εk;i  N 0; σ2k
 
. Equations (8) and (9) are modeled jointly with maximum
likelihood. The error terms εA;i and εB;i are specified following a bivariate normal distribution with
zero mean, standard deviations σ2A and σ
2
B, and correlation ρ. By estimating these equations jointly,
we can test if unobservable factors are impacting total head purchased in each question. If ρ is zero,
then the equations can be estimated independently (Cornick, Cox, and Gould, 1994).
6. Results and Discussion: Choice Experiment
Summary statistics by treatment are shown in Table 1. Responses per treatment ranged from 36
to 42.
For the following models, AMEs are reported in the article; however, model coefficient esti-
mates are in online supplementary online supplementary Appendix E.
6.1. Purchasing Feeder Cattle (Treatment 1–3)
Recall, the difference between question A and question B is participants were presented additional
information (an information shock) on potential output price risk mitigation strategies in
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question B (futures hedge information with non-ambiguous basis in treatment 1, forward con-
tract in treatment 2, or futures hedge with ambiguous basis in treatment 3). Likelihood ratio
tests were conducted to determine if observations from treatments 1–3 could be pooled. The
hypothesis that observations from the three treatments could be pooled was not rejected
X2  7:06; P value 0:99 . Therefore, there are no differences in responses to question B
based on the output price risk mitigation information given or the ambiguous versus non-
ambiguous basis presentation.
The bivariate model AME from the pooled feeder cattle procurement questions (treatments 1,
2, and 3) is in Table 7. The statistically significant ρ (see online supplementary Appendix Table E.
3) indicates there is a relationship between question A and B residuals. Thus, these questions
should be estimated jointly. Model E is the base model with explanatory variables only for the
information shown (source premium, CME price, and basis). Model F includes additional
Table 7. Pooled feeder cattle purchasing treatments average marginal effects (treatments 1–3)
Model E Model F
Question A Question B Question A Question B
Source premium −10.32*** −7.81*** −10.56*** −7.81***
(1.18) (1.20) (1.18) (1.22)
[−12.64, −8.00] [−10.17, −5.45] [−12.86, −8.25] [−10.21, −5.42]
P value for test if source premium
AME statistically different
0.11 0.09
CME price 0.09 0.21
(0.77) (0.81)
[−1.42, 1.61] [−1.37, 1.79]
Basis 4.42*** 4.44***
(0.98) (0.98)
[2.50, 6.35] [2.52, 6.37]
Capacity 1,000 −15.83* −14.52*
(9.32) (8.35)
[−34.10, 2.45] [−30.87, 1.84]
Custom feeder 37.05*** 16.74
(12.84) (12.51)
[11.89, 62.20] [−7.77, 41.25]
Risk averse 3.62 0.27
(8.70) (8.46)
[−13.43, 20.67] [−16.32, 16.86]
Purchased single source before −0.58 3.88
(9.05) (8.81)
[−18.31, 17.15] [−13.39, 21.15]
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 95% confidence intervals are reported in square brackets. * P< 0.10, ** P< 0.05,
*** P< 0.01.
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explanatory variables: binary variables for operation size, custom feeder, risk aversion, and if they
have purchased single source cattle before.
The source premium AMEs are negative, statistically significant, and similar across both mod-
els E and F. Focusing on model F, a $1.00/cwt increase in the source premium decreases feeder
steers purchased (from a maximum of 150) by 10.56 and 7.81 head in questions A and B, respec-
tively. This indicates the willingness to purchase feeder cattle decreases as source premium
increases. To test our hypothesis that a relationship exists between animal health and price risk
mitigation strategies, we test if the source premium AMEs in questions A (no output price risk
mitigation information) and B (output price risk mitigation information is given) are statistically
different. The source premium marginal effects in questions A and B are statistically different
from each other (P value  0:09) in model F and marginally different from each other
(P value  0:11) in model E. Thus, there is evidence that a relationship exists between animal
health and price risk mitigation as operators were less sensitive to increases in source premium
whenever output price risk mitigation information (CME price and basis) is given.
6.2. Discussion of Core Hypotheses in Treatments 1–3
Investigating the AMEs, there is evidence of a complementary relationship. Finding that the
source premium AME when no output pricing information is given (question A) is larger in mag-
nitude (more elastic) than when output price hedging information is given (question B) supports
this conclusion. An increase in source premium would decrease profit per head. Overall, the out-
put hedging information shocks decrease the sensitivity to an increase in source premium.
In consumer choice studies, willingness to pay estimates vary depending on the number and
mix of attributes shown (Pozo, Tonsor, and Schroeder, 2012; Gao and Schroeder, 2009).
Therefore, we recognize that having more information presented (output price risk management
information) could influence coefficients and marginal effects. However, the identified relation-
ship between source premium and output price risk mitigation information is rational. If output
prices are considered strong, then more feedlots will be interested in placing feeder steers and
would potentially consider paying a premium for single source steers. By purchasing single source
steers, producers reduce uncertainty on the animals’ performance, which in turn increases the
likelihood of actually receiving higher output prices. Conversely, if output prices are weak, then
feedlots will place fewer cattle and potentially ignore single source cattle premiums.
6.3. Discussion of Core Hypotheses in Treatments 4–7
Results for treatments 4–7 are in online supplementary Appendix C. To test the core hypothesis
that a relationship between animal health risk and output price risk exists, the 95% confidence
intervals from the decomposed AMEs are compared across the base treatments and those with
the single source information shock.9 There is no evidence that the single source information
shock changes the AME of the output hedging information.
Multiple explanations for little evidence of a relationship between incoming cattle health risk
and output pricing strategies exist. First of all, the hypothetical nature of the survey and how his-
torical seasonality in profits partially align with any one-time assessment (Schulz, 2019) cannot be
ignored. Furthermore, livestock producers do not necessarily hedge at the time of placement but
can hedge at any time during the feeding period; this is especially true if the net price from the
hedge is less than the breakeven price (Schulz, 2016). Our findings suggest that incoming cattle
characteristics do not impact output hedging decisions (at least the source of cattle in our
9Schenker and Gentleman (2001) found that comparison of 95% confidence intervals is more conservative than standard
methods of significance testing when the null hypothesis is true and falsely rejects the null hypothesis more frequently when
the null hypothesis is false.
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experiment). Potentially, feedlot operators largely ignore incoming cattle characteristics because
the decision is already made, likely reflecting pre-existing business relationships, and cannot be
changed. Thus, this sunk decision is not considered moving forward. Furthermore, potentially
animal health and price risk mitigation are handled by different managers at the feedlot.
Therefore, these risks are managed independently even if they could potentially be managed
jointly. This issue of risks not being considered jointly in complex systems was noted in Pate-
Cornell (1996) when discussing tiles for space shuttles.
Alternatively, persistence of past behavior and existing relationships with live cattle buyers was
present. There could be a high cost in switching output pricing or output risk management strat-
egies. This could be a reason for little evidence of animal health risk mitigation information
impacting output hedging decisions. In the U.S., there are approximately 729,000 operations with
beef cows, over 30,000 feedlots (USDA-NASS, 2019a), and 650 beef packing plants, 179 of which
harvest more than 1,000 head (USDA, 2017). Therefore, there are more options to buy feeder
cattle than to sell these cattle once finished. This would support our finding of a relationship
between incoming cattle and output pricing risk in the feeder cattle purchasing scenarios
(treatments 1–3) but no relationship in the output pricing scenarios (treatments 4–7).
7. Conclusion and Implications
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study seeking to understand feedlot operators’
decision-making regarding both animal health and output price risk management. Our objective
was to determine if feedlot operators manage these two risks jointly or independently. The animal
health practice of interest was single source steers while the output price risk management strate-
gies were futures contracts, forward contracts, other, and none (accept cash price at the time of
sale). An online survey was utilized to collect primary data from feedlot operators about their use
of risk management tools, producer and operation characteristics, and views on risk mitigation.
A split-sample choice experiment was used, placing feedlot operators in a forward-looking mind-
set to better understand their risk management decision-making. Treatments 1–3 asked operators
feeder steer procurement oriented questions while treatments 4–7 were output pricing oriented
scenarios.
Simple Tobit models of past feeder cattle procurement and output hedging identified a negative
relationship between past purchases of feeder animals from a single source and sole use of spot
markets in marketing (no price risk mitigation). Therefore, a positive relationship is implied
between animal health and output price risk mitigation. The split-sample choice experiment
allowed for a deeper understanding of this relationship.
Using treatments 1–3, evidence of a complementary relationship between willingness to pay a
source premium and output pricing information was found. Willingness to purchase single source
cattle was more inelastic when output pricing information was provided. This complementary
relationship could be one reason why producers do not hedge output price risk as much as ana-
lysts expect. Potentially, if more single source cattle were available, or offered at a lower premium,
producers would increase their use of output price hedging. Furthermore, since there is less uncer-
tainty in single source feeder steers performance in the feedlot (e.g., finish weight, death loss, etc.),
producers could more confidently match their production to futures and forward contract
specifications.
No evidence of a relationship was found between information on feeder cattle source and out-
put pricing risk mitigation strategies in treatments 4–7. All of the AMEs for price risk manage-
ment variables were not statistically different across treatments whether single source information
was given or not, and many were insignificant. Potentially, these findings suggest that feedlot
operators view the feeder cattle purchase as a “sunk decision” when deciding how to manage out-
put price risk. Therefore, producers only consider another risk mitigation strategy when that
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decision is still applicable. Additionally, there was evidence of persistent behavior in output price
hedging. This could be the result of existing relationships with cattle buyers and the relatively
limited number of outlets to sell finished cattle. Potentially, this persistence could also stem from
unfamiliarity with other output pricing strategies and high switching cost. The lack of a relation-
ship between single source information and output pricing strategies could also be a function of
the mitigation strategies considered. In the live cattle marketing options, no distinction was made
regarding cattle quality. Conceivably, single source cattle might grade better at harvest and receive
quality premiums (for those using grid pricing); however, this was not accounted for in our
scenarios.
Our study is the first to look at the relationship in feedlot producers’ decision-making regarding
animal health and price risk. However, there are limitations. First, a hypothetical choice experi-
ment and self-reported survey data were used. However, by making comparisons across treat-
ments, hypothetical bias concerns are minimized (Lusk and Schroeder, 2004; Tonsor,
2011). Additionally, we recognize choice experiment findings are a function of the attributes
chosen—here animal health and risk mitigation strategies (Gao and Schroeder, 2009; Pozo,
Tonsor, and Schroeder, 2012). Feedlots animal health risk mitigation strategies can be complex
and dynamic. To keep the survey manageable for producer participants, we chose to proxy animal
health risk mitigation with single source cattle procurement. Furthermore, there could be other
benefits of single source cattle, such as lower transaction costs, that are not accounted for in this
analysis. Future research could consider more complex designs to capture producers’ trade-offs in
risk management decisions, or if available, use information on feedlots’ actual usage of different
risk mitigation strategies.
Our findings are relevant to ongoing policy discussions regarding livestock producers’ use of
LGM and LRP programs. In 2019, increased subsidy rates and other enhancements were made to
these programs to better suit livestock producers needs with the hope of increasing participation.
For example, effective July 1, 2019, the LRP subsidy rate increased from 13% for all coverage levels
to 20–35% based on selected coverage level (Feedstuffs, 2019). Additional changes to premiums
are being considered in 2020 for the 2021 marketing year (Willis, 2020). Our results suggest that
the effectiveness of these subsidy rates at incentivizing participation will also depend on other risk
mitigation strategies in place. For example, the sensitivity of participation to the subsidy rates
might be less than expected if producers are also managing animal health risk. Therefore, it is
important to consider other types of risk mitigation efforts that an operation may be using in
addition to price risk mitigation when designing policy instruments and estimating participation.
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